Introducing new technology into italian certified electronic mail: a proposal by Buzzi, Marina et al.
Introducing New Technology into Italian Certified
Electronic Mail: A Proposal
Marina Buzzi, Luca Ferrucci, Francesco Gennai, Claudio Petrucci
{IIT,ISTI}-CNR - Area della Ricerca di Pisa - Italy
Email: {gennai,ferrucci}@isti.cnr.it, marina.buzzi@iit.cnr.it
Agid - Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale - Roma - Italy
Email: petrucci@agid.gov.it
Abstract—Over the last decade, an increasing number of
Certified E-Mail systems (CEM) have been implemented in
Europe and worldwide, but their diffusion and validity are mainly
restricted in a national arena. Despite the effort of European
Union (EU) that recently defined a specification for guaranteeing
interoperability of CEM systems between Member States, its
adoption has not be not yet fuelled, mainly since any CEM system
receives a legal value by its State legislation. It is difficult to
extend the legal value of CEM security mechanisms, e.g. receipts
with timestamps which are considered evidences and legal proofs
in disputes that may arise from different Parties inside a State,
unless a common political and legal agreement will be created. At
this aim, recently EU introduce the new Regulation on Electronic
Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) , to address this issue.
We believe that the first step for encouraging a more large
adoption between communities is to implement CEMs using
standard worldwide recognized solutions.
In this paper we propose a technical evolution of the Italian
CEM, called Posta Elettronica Certificata (PEC) moving from
a close mechanisms to the adoption of a more standardized,
distributed solution, based on DNS Security Extensions (DNSSec).
This proposal would have a minimal impact on the legislation,
restricted to the annex that defines PEC technical rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main objectives of EU is to accelerate the
adoption of the eEurope plans, filling the gap between different
degrees of ICT penetration in the Member States.
The Digital Agenda is a priority of the Italian government,
with the goal of improving service, while reducing costs.
Established by the Development Decree of June 22, 2012
[1], the Agency for Digital Italy (AGID) has the task of
implementing the objectives defined by the Italian government,
acting as a supervisor and coordinating the development of
ICT in the public administration and promoting goals and
challenges conforming to the Digital Agenda for Europe
(DAE). DAE was presented by the European Commission
(EC) in 2010 with the aim of exploiting the potential of ICT
to promote innovation, economic growth and competitiveness.
The main goal of the Agenda is to promote solid socio-
economic benefits thanks to a single digital market based
on high-speed Internet and interoperable applications. DAE
is one of the seven main initiatives identified in the EU
2020 Strategy, for promoting a smart and sustainable UE.
The spread of digital technologies would favour employment
and simplify administrative procedures, thus offering citizens
a better quality of life, with more efficient health services,
simpler access to public services and cultural resources. DAE
also identifies the main problems that may undermine the
diffusion of ICT and indicates an European common strategy
to overcome these obstacles by identifying actions required of
Member States for bridging the Digital Divide and providing
accessible services for any EU citizen. Each member state
has to absorb the European guidelines, implementing its own
strategy for reaching the goals of the DAE, defining priorities
and strategy based on national context and resources.
The Agency is the organization responsible for coordinate
and monitoring the progress and quality of this process in
Italy. The Italian PEC is a system that provides legal evidence
attesting the sending and delivery of electronic documents to
the sender, with associated timestamps. It offers a complete,
usable and reliable solution for the secure transmission of
documents. The Italian Government assigned to AGID as
the organization of reference for PEC. Broadly speaking, the
institutional activities of AGID include receiving and assessing
applications for subject candidates to play the role of PEC
provider (as defined in the circular CNIPA CR/49 of November
24, 2005 [2]) supervising the activity of the PEC provider
(maintenance of requirements, service levels, usage statistics)
and supervising the interoperability test (according to the
circular CNIPA CR/51 of December 7, 2006 [3]).
In this paper we describe a possible technical evolution of
the PEC system, also discussing its impact on the current
legislation that regulates the PEC services and control its
quality and interoperability. The paper is organized as follows:
section II describes the actual functional schema of the Italian
PEC, after a brief introduction on the main properties a CEM
should satisfy. Section III introduces other european CEMs,
analysing what properties they actually satisfy and the level
of interoperability. Then, section IV gives an overview of the
above mentioned proposal of Italian PEC and section V draws
conclusive remarks and focus on future developments.
II. ITALIAN CERTIFIED ELECTRONIC MAIL
In this section we illustrate the architecture of the Italian
PEC [4]. In [5] are described a set of properties that CEM
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systems should satisfy. A protocol provides Non-repudiation
of origin (NRO) if it gives evidence against the false denial
of having originated the message and Non-repudiation of
receipt (NRR) if it gives evidence against the false denial
of having received the message. Moreover it provides Non-
repudiation of submission (NRS) and Non-repudiation of
delivery (NRD) if it gives evidence against the false denial of
having submitted or delivered the message, respectively. In a
CEM protocol, Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) may be involved
in addition to sender and receiver. In the case it is involved
actively in each protocol step it is called inline TTP; this type
of TTP usually has to process the entire message as a proxy.
Instead, if it is only involved in a dispute resolution process,
it is called offline TTP.
Figure 1 shows the functional schema of the PEC system.
Fig. 1. Functional schema of PEC
The system is layered on top of the e-mail architecture based
on the SMTP protocol to ensure compatibility with standard
e-mail client and to guarantee interoperability with tradi-
tional e-mail systems. Delivery agents, called PEC providers,
act as an inline TTP between senders and recipients. They
have to be accredited by AGID for compliance with given
technical and legal requirements, as requested in [6]. Both
senders and recipients must register a mailbox with a PEC
provider. The PEC technical rules do not make any assump-
tions about the communication protocol between end user and
his PEC provider. They only define the minimum security
requirements for authentication and confidentiality, e.g., with
username/password combined with a TLS connection. PEC
providers must sign all messages and evidences according to
the S/MIME v3 standard [7], with an x.509 v3 certificate [8].
The usage of end-to-end cryptography, e.g. using a na-
tional eID document to uniquely identify users, has several
advantages as NRO and sender’s authentication, but implies
an extensive penetration of technology in society, requiring
a high degree of user technical knowledge. To mask a user
from the complexity of cryptographic applications and its legal
implications, it may be applied server-to-server, privileging
usability against security, as the case for PEC.
Now we describe the phases of the PEC functional protocol.
First of all, the sender’s UA authenticates against the Sender’s
Access Point (S-AP) and submits the message to the S-AP
Message Transfer Agent (MTA). The S-AP performs validity
checks on the messages and stores an NRS evidence into the
sender’s Message Store (MS), if they pass. Otherwise, a non-
acceptance evidence (negative NRS) is generated and stored
into the sender’s MS including the reason of the failure. Then,
the S-AP wraps the message into a new, signed S/MIME
v3 envelope with his x509 v3 certificate and forwards it to
the Recipient’s Reception Point (R-RP) using SMTP. If the
R-RP does not acknowledge this message with a take-in-
charge evidence within the next 12 h, the S-AP stores a non-
delivery-to-RP evidence (negative NRD) into the sender’s MS.
If this operation was successful, the R-RP verifies the digital
signature of the S-AP. If it is, R-RP returns a take-in-charge
evidence to the S-RP, which is forwarded to the Sender’s
Delivery Point (S-DP) and stored into the sender’s MS. Then,
the R-RP forwards the message to the R-DP, returning a non-
take-in charge evidence to the S-RP in case of an error, which
is forwarded to the S-DP and stored into the sender’s MS.
If the R-DP operation was successful, an NRD evidence is
returned by the R-DP to the S-RP and forwarded to the S-DP,
which stores the message into the sender’s MS. In all other
cases, a non-delivery evidence (negative NRD) is returned.
III. CERTIFIED E-MAIL SYSTEMS
For more than a decade the EC has supported initiatives
and projects in order to ensure economic growth. Some of
these projects aim to create interoperability frameworks for
the mutual recognition of electronic documents and delivery.
According to the targets of each project, cross-border inter-
operability must not require a completely new communication
infrastructure, rather it should be achieved by bridging existing
systems. This section, after an overview of the architecture
of two of the most important European CEMs and the in-
troduction of a recent standard, Registered Electronic Mail
(REM), discusses their interoperability on a technical and
organizational level. In [5] is possible to find more details.
A. Austrian DDS
Requirements for the Austrian CEM, called Document
Delivery System (DDS) [9], are laid down by the ”Law
on the Delivery of Official Documents” [10]. DDS defines
the following main types of entities: (1) senders: all public
entities can register as sender, (2) delivery agents (DA):
they act as inline TTP and have to be accredited by the
Federal Chancellery, (3) recipients: all physical persons and
corporate bodies can register with one or more DAs, and
(4) Central lookup service (CLS): the Austrian Federal
Chancellery operates a lookup service holding the address
data of all recipients registered with a DA. Only recipients
have to register with DAs, while senders are required to
register and authenticate themselves with the CLS using an
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X509v3 certificate. Recipient’s registration is based on the
Austrian national electronic ID card, which complies to the
EU Signature Directive [11].
Senders addresses recipients with an unique ID, derived
from the national identification number. First of all, the
sender’s user agent (UA) must query the CLS to determine
with which DA(s) a recipient is registered, using an HTTPs
GET request based on SSL client authentication. Each DA list
entry contains a unique billing token, generated using strong
RSA encryption. Then, the sender’s UA chooses a DA from
the list and submits the message to the web service endpoint
of the recipient’s DA, using the SOAP transport protocol.
Senders are recommended to electronically sign documents
to provide an NRO evidence. The DA takes the message in
charge and stores it into the recipient’s MS. The recipient’s
UA authenticates himself with his DA using a web-browser
or e-mail client and generates an NRR evidence by signing
an XML-based proof of receipt using his citizen card, then
the message can be retrieved by the recipient’s UA from the
MS. The DA timestamps and digitally countersigns the NRR
evidence and returns it to either the sender’s e-mail address or
a web service provided by the sender’s UA. If a recipient does
not pick up the message within two weeks, the DA returns a
non-delivery evidence (negative NRR) back to the sender.
B. German DeMail
De-Mail is a project of the German government with the
aim of providing a reliable and legally binding communication
infrastructure for administrations and citizens [12]. De-Mail
is layered on top of the SMTP protocol. The main types of
entities are similar to the ones of DDS. DAs act as inline TTPs
and have to be accredited by the BSI for compliance with
given technical and organizational requirements. Both senders
and recipients have to register a mailbox with a DA, using an
official ID document or the national eID, which complies to the
EU Signature Directive. The technical concept distinguishes
between two types of communication channels having differ-
ent security requirements: the communication between end-
entities and their DAs and the intra-provider communication
between DAs, which is based on SMTP and a secure TLS
connection. Also user authentication is required to be based
on encrypted channels, e.g., a TLS - based connection. The
system architecture provides consistent encryption between
all communication nodes. On a voluntary basis, recipients
may list their own encryption certificate in a public directory.
De-Mail provides two basic delivery qualities for senders:
standard mail and certified mail. Standard mail only ensures
message integrity and confidentiality between the sender and
the recipient throughout the whole communication channel. In
the following, we describe De-Mail system.
First of all, the sender’s UA authenticates itself with his
DA and submits the message to the DA’s MTA using a
secured channel, e.g. a TLS channel. The message may also be
encrypted for the recipient and/or digitally signed, e.g. using
x.509v3 certificates, to provide an NRO evidence. The sender’s
DA checks the message for correctness (existing recipient,
headers, etc.) and stores an NRS evidence into the sender’s
MS, including the hash value of the original message and a
timestamp. The NRS evidence must be signed by the sender’s
MTA. The sender’s provider encrypts the message with its
own private key and the public key of the recipient’s provider
and forwards the message to the recipient’s MTA, where
it is decrypted, checked for correctness and stored into the
recipient’s MS. Finally, the recipient’s MTA generates an NRD
evidence containing the hash value of the original message and
a timestamp. This evidence is returned to the sender’s MTA,
which stores it into the sender’s MS. Like the NRS evidence,
the recipient’s MTA must sign the NRD evidence.
C. Registered Electronic Mail Standard
In 2008, ETSI published a first version of the REM standard
[13]. REM is primarily intended as an evidence standard
to establish interoperability between different certified e-mail
domains operating under different policies and countries. Now,
we briefly discuss the five parts of the REM standard:
1) Part 1: Architecture: it describes the logical model of
an REM system, introducing roles, styles of operation,
interfaces and main evidence types. An REM system
is called REM Management Domain (REM-MD) and
acts as an inline TTP between senders and recipients. A
REM-MD consists of at least three core components: an
MTA, a message store (MS) and an evidence provider
(EP). REM supports two basic styles of operation:
store and forward (S&F) where messages are directly
forwarded to the recipient, and store and notify (S&N),
where the recipient is only notified and must retrieve the
message from the sender’s REM-MD MS.
2) Part 2: Data requirements, Formats and Signatures
for REM: it deals with the specification of REM-
MD envelopes, REM dispatches and REM evidences. A
REM-MD envelope is defined as a MIME message en-
capsulating both REM dispatches and REM evidences.
A REM dispatch holds the delivery content as payload.
REM evidences are well-structured containers holding
all evidence-related data. The standard specifies three
evidence formats and the corresponding signature types.
It also describes in detail the mechanisms for trust
establishment between different REM-MDs with the
ETSI Trust-service Status List (TSL) (ETSI, 2009)
standard for mutual recognition of trusted REM services.
3) Part 3: Information Security Policy Requirements
for REM Management Domains: it specifies the as-
sessment of security requirements of REM-MDs being
compliant to ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO/IEC, 2005a). Controls
to mitigate security risks have to be selected according
to the ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO/IEC, 2005b). It also defines
the authentication mechanisms and their quality levels
for senders and recipients, and restricts the type of
signatures to be used to increase interoperability.
4) Part 4: REM-MD Conformance Profiles: it introduces
two conformance profiles and specifies the mandatory
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requirements a REM-MD has to meet to be compliant
with each profile.
5) Part 5: REM-MD Interoperability Profiles: it profiles
the standard to ease interoperability between different
SMTP-based REM-MDs, for both REM dispatches and
REM evidences.
Now, we describe the REM protocol steps in case of the
S&F style. First of all, the sender’s UA submits a message
through the sender message submission interface (S-MSI) to
the MTA of the sender’s REM Management Domain (S-REM
MD), which may create an NRS evidence and store it into the
sender’s MS. The S-REM MD MTA forwards a REM dispatch
through the MD relay interface (MD-RI) to the MTA of
the recipient’s REM Management Domain (R-REM MD). The
REM dispatch includes the sender’s original message and may
include also the aforementioned NRS evidence. The R-REM
MD MTA stores the message into the recipient’s MS. Then, the
R-REM MD EP creates an NRD evidence and returns it back
to the S-REM MD MTA through the MD-RI, which stores it
into the sender’s MS.
Depending on the REM implementation, several other ac-
tors, evidence types and message flows may be involved. Third
parties, such as system components, TTPs, arbiters or other
users, may retrieve evidences from MS through the so-called
third-party evidence retrieval interface (TP-ERI).
D. CEMs properties and interoperability
In this section, we describe which of the properties reported
in section II are actually applied by the CEMs described above,
summarized in figure 2: a black circle represents a property
which is satisfied, a white one represent an optional property
which is satisfied only under particular conditions, while the
absence of a circle means that the property is not satisfied.
We also discuss the findings and impact in the context of
interoperability.
Fig. 2. Classification of CEMs according to satisfied security properties
Figure does not report properties which are universally
applied by CEMs discussed above. In particular, all solutions
use inline TTPs, whereas actual research is focusing on offline
solutions. In fact, inline TTPs may become a bottleneck
because of the amount of communicational and computational
power needed, but we can note that certified email traffic is
limited respect to traditional email traffic due to lack of spam
and the cost of the service. Instead, to reduce the need of com-
putational power, especially for cryptographic operations, the
most part of inline TTPs use off-the-shelf components, such
as Hardware Security Modules (HSM). Finally, inline TTPs
request that all entities completely trust them; in practice,
this seems to be mitigated by the fact that TTPs are required
by law to undergo a technical and organizational accredita-
tion. There are also some benefits: first of all, inline TTPs
allow the full control of message flows, facilitating the CEM
deployment; then, they allow asynchronous communication,
decoupling sender and recipients from each other, avoiding
direct interaction; finally, since they take in charge the most
part of protocol operations such as notification of evidence
and authentication of messages, end users can use traditional
email clients or web browsers.
Another common property for all the CEMs is the use of
standard electronic signatures for the generation of evidences
or to guarantee authenticity and integrity of the exchanged
electronic documents, as in Italian PEC.
For non-repudiation services, we do not see a common
approach. Senders have to authenticate against inline TTPs,
which seems to be sufficient for most CEMs to ensure some
kind of NRO, so NRO evidences are not seen as necessary.
NRS evidences appear to be essential in provider-based sys-
tems where messages may leave the sender’s provider domain.
However, there is a consensus on the usage of NRD evidences,
which seems to be a core property. Using inline TTPs, an NRR
evidence is not necessarily needed, because TTPs can preserve
messages and return a delivery receipt to the sender even if
the recipient has not yet retrieved the message.
Actually, most CEMs are closed systems, and do not provide
interfaces to other CEM to interoperate. For example, end
users have to register with multiple CEM to address different
recipients, increasing costs, so there is the need for a global
certified electronic mail system. The EC, as discussed at
the beginning of this section, lunched several initiatives and
projects to increase interoperability. ETSI tried to fill this gap
by introducing the REM standard, described in section III-C,
but it has been rarely used so far and has not been widely
adopted by governments or industries; for example, the Italian
PEC and the German De-Mail are fully compatible with the
Part 5 of REM, since it deals with SMTP-based CEMs, while
Austrian DDS is not compatible due to the use of HTTP.
So, recently, a Large Scale Pilot (LSP) european project,
called Simple Procedures Online for Crossborder Services
(SPOCS), have been started to address this issue. SPOCS is
based on an appropriate framework on top of existing systems,
applying the design principles of the European Interoperability
Framework [14]. The main idea behind the concept is a gate-
way solution making CEMs interoperable with a multilateral
approach on different layers, including technical, semantic and
procedural interoperability.
Independently, AGID published the PEC technical rules as
an Informational Request for Comment (RFC6109) in April
2011 [15] to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
The idea of the Italian Government was to share this experi-
ence with the international community and receive feedback
in order to encourage the development and consolidation of a
common standard.
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As mentioned in the abstract, recently EU introduced the
eIDAS Regulation [16], which replaces the EU Signature
Directive [11]. Its main purpose is to leverage the LSPs
as a pillar for the development of interoperability of cross-
border eID and trust, by forcing Member States to a mutual
recognition and acceptance of electronic identification, to give
legal effect to trust services and to provide a legal cross-
border framework for electronic seals, time stamping and
electronic document acceptability and delivery. AGID is now
investigating if PEC technical rules are full compliant with
the Regulation, to plan changes to the legislation and the
specifications accordingly.
As part of this process, in the next section we introduce a
possible evolution of the PEC, which purpose is to increase
interoperability and standardization level of the CEM solution.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN PEC
In this section, we introduce a possible evolution to Italian
PEC technical specifications to increase standardization and
interoperability of the actual solution.
In the actual solution, PEC providers must sign all messages
and evidences according to the S/MIME v3 standard with
an x.509 v3 certificate. This certificate, and the list of the
accredited PEC providers, are stored in a centralized directory
based on Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP),
managed by AGID; the access to this directory is limited
to PEC providers only. This mechanism is not interoperable
with other CEMs, is not scalable and based on a proprietary
LDAP directory schema; our idea is to substitute it with
a distributed solution based on the publication of a PEC
provider’s certificate in the Distributed Name System (DNS)
[17], [18]. DNS is a worldwide distributed database which
associates various information with domain names. In this
paper, we use the DNSSec and the recent TLSA standard,
which are described in the next section.
A. DNS Security Extension
DNSSec [19]–[21] is an extension of the DNS that provides
authentication of data to DNS clients, authenticated denial of
existence, and data integrity, but not availability or confiden-
tiality. DNSSec is perfectly backward compatible with DNS
and it inherits the same hierarchy, so that a DNSSec server
can resolve DNS query and viceversa, in a best-effort way.
For this purpose it adds new Resource Records(RRS):
• RRSIG Record: contains digital signature to authenticate
a set of RRs
• DNSKEY Record: contains the public key used to verify
RRSIG’s record signature
• DS Record: contains the hash of the public key of the
delegated zone digitally signed by the private key of the
parent zone
• NSEC Record: contains a link of the following domain
name in the zone to authenticate the denial of existence
The DANE IETF working group aims to develop protocols
and techniques to enable internet applications to establish
cryptographically secure communications based on DNSSec,
to replace the traditional model based on Public Key Infras-
tructure [8]. With RFC6698 [22] DANE specifies a new RR,
called TLSA, to embed in an authoritative DNSSec zone
the authentication information for a x.509 v3 certificate (or
part of it). The TLSA RR links the x.509 v3 certificate or
public key with its domain name, thus forming a TLSA
certificate association. The certificate embedded in this way
is authenticated by the DNSSec trust chain.
B. Architecture of the proposed evolution
In this section, we describe briefly the logical architecture
of the proposed evolution of the Italian PEC.
To distribute responsibility and to increase scalability, the
proposal required that each PEC provider must create and
manage its own authoritative DNSSec zone, with a unique and
well-known domain name. Each PEC provider must publish
at least two RRs:
1) a TLSA RR, which embeds the x.509 v3 certificate of
the PEC provider. The TLSA standard allows an entity
to release and revoke autonomously its own certificates,
avoiding the use of a Certification Authority (CA).
2) a TXT RR, which contains a unique string signed with
a private key managed by AGID. This record is useful
to identify an accredited PEC provider.
The set of all TXT RRs published by PEC providers
substitutes the list of accredited PEC providers previously
maintained in the centralized LDAP directory. To authenticate
such records, the proposal required AGID to create its own
DNSSec zone to publish a TLSA RR which embeds the needed
public key.
Figure 3 shows the flow of a PEC message from a Sender
to a Receiver, limited to the modifications involved by this
proposal. S-DNS and R-DNS are the DNSSec zone of the
PEC providers which manage the PEC domains of the Sender
and the Receiver, respectively.
Fig. 3. Functional schema of the evolution of PEC
To check if the PEC provider of the recipient is accredited,
the S-AP submits a DNSSec query to retrieve the TXT RR of
the Receiver’s PEC provider and the TLSA RR of the public
key managed by AGID. If these RRs are present and validated,
than the Receiver’s PEC provider is accredited. In case of
a DNS system error (DNS request timeout, one of the RRs
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is not present or cannot be validated, etc...), the Receiver’s
PEC provider is safely considered not accredited, to prevent
possible Internet attacks to the DNS system.
When the R-RP receives the certified e-mail, it must perform
a check on the Sender’s PEC provider similar to the one
performed by the S-AP. After it, R-RP submits a DNSSec
query to retrieve the TLSA RR which embeds the x.509 v3
certificate of the Sender’s PEC provider to verify the digital
signature of the S-AP. In case of a DNS system error (DNS
request timeout, the TLSA RR is not present or not validated,
etc...), the email is safely considered not a PEC message and
a negative NRD evidence is returned by the R-RP to the S-RP.
In the following, we describe the main benefits of this
proposal. First of all, we must note that the use of DNSSec
guarantees a high level of security in the retrieval of in-
formation from an insecure communication channel such as
Internet, allowing the protection of the answer to DNS query
against Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks. Moreover, it
guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the data contained
in the DNSSec zones, ensuring the bind with the origin and
allowing the generation of NRO, NRS and NRD evidence.
Other benefits are (1) an increased scalability in terms of a
possible growth in the number of PEC providers and mail-
boxes, (2) the limited number of changes to the actual PEC
technical rules; in fact, the new proposal impacts only on the
algorithm and the way to store, access and retrieve information
about the x.509 v3 certificates of the PEC providers, (3) an
increased standardization degree, which led to an increase
in interoperability with other CEMs. For instance, a De-
Mail provider, which is based on the same transport protocol,
could authenticate a PEC message by retrieving the x.509 v3
certificate of a PEC provider from its DNSSec zone.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In the process of dematerialization of physical documents,
CEMs have been created in order to introduce certification
of electronic communication with legal validity, analogously
to the surface certified mail, which usually provides both
sender and receiver with sending and delivery receipts. Those
evidences are commonly used in civil administrative cases
or disputes and rely on the existence of a TTP that is not
involved/interested in the content of communications, and
carried out the services, such as Postal Entities or a CA, e.g.
to build a Trust Chain in electronic document protocol.
Being the electronic mail an open, interoperable and inse-
cure tools, it needs to be adapted by increasing its level of
certification. Introducing certification elements in the Internet
mail, also if supported by the adoption of standards, fall down
into the introduction of a Third Trust Part. This requires agree-
ments between Service Providers inside and outside Country
boundaries, a process that would also involve Government,
difficult to be pursued worldwide.
In conclusion, this proposal does not impact substantially
on the current Italian legislation, requiring only to change the
technical rules that are annex of the law, maintaining the same
security level but moving from PKI to the DNSSec hierarchy
with great advantages in term of adoption of a standardized
distributed solution and cost reduction. As a future work, we
will complete the modification to the PEC technical specifi-
cations, starting a complete set of functional tests to validate
the practical application of the new proposal. Furthermore, we
will investigate about the introduction of Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) [23] as authentication mechanism
to authorize and uniquely identified PEC end-users, to fill the
gap in the PEC technical rules mentioned in section II, in order
to achieve a better complain with eIDAS requirements.
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